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Thailand's Twenty-First Century
Administrative Courts
FRANK W. MUNGER, PEERAWICH THOVIRIYAVEJ, VORAPITCHAYA
RABIABLOK
INTRODUCTION-NEW COURTS IN ASIA
New courts in Asia's rapidly developing states offer an opportunity
to understand how a court system takes root in a society. This article
presents a case study of the development of administrative court
structure, functions, and practice in Thailand: Southeast Asia's newest
system of administrative courts. Thailand's new courts are not an
isolated example. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in
Asia and elsewhere, colonial rulers and traditional elites adapted
European or American judicial institutions and practices as a means to
centralize and secure their power.1 Late twentieth century pressures
experienced by many developing states to expand the flexibility of
private markets and empower civil society have demanded further
adaptations of state structure and authority. 2 In response to these
pressures, judicialization-the expansion of judicial authority at the
expense of other institutions of governance-has become a nearly
universal feature of transitions from traditional to modern states in the
1. See, e.g., DANIEL S. LEV, LEGAL EVOLUTION AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN
INDONESIA: SELECTED ESSAYS (2000); JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR
GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2009); Frank W. Munger,
Law and the Legal Profession in Thailand, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY (Richard L. Abel, et. al.
eds., forthcoming 2018).
2. See Andrew Harding & Penelope Nicholson, New Courts in Asia: Law,
Development, and Judicialization, NEW COURTS IN ASIA 1, 2-4 (Andrew Harding &
Penelope Nicholson eds., 2010).
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developing world.3
Theories of the establishment of courts in developing countries
under pressure to modernize governance argue that courts appeal to
traditional elites with declining power as a means to control political
change. 4 A great deal of evidence supports the argument that the
purposes of elites who support new courts are self-serving, 5 but wide
variation in the history and performance of particular courts suggests
the theory's limitations. 6 Moreover, while scholars have written
primarily about constitutional courts, administrative courts play a
different, and potentially far larger, role by overseeing the day-to-day
relationships between a government and its citizens in ways other
courts lack the power to do. 7
Thai administrative courts provide an opportunity to examine the
development of new courts in an unstable political environment, which
is a characteristic of many developing societies. Thailand's
Constitutional Court and administrative court system were created in
1997 by a celebrated liberal constitution that established full democracy
and independent institutions to oversee the new constitutional order.
After almost ten years of increasing conflict over corruption by
overreaching populist Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the system
of democratic checks and balances was in collapse. In 2005, the
Constitutional Court invalidated an election called by Thaksin but
boycotted by the opposing party. A military coup set the constitution
aside and drove Thaksin from office in 2006. After a little more than a
year, neither adoption of a revised constitution nor restoration of elected
government under a revised constitution in 2007 mitigated deep
political divisions, street violence, or political instability. A second
military coup, in 2014, has placed elected government on hold once
again. After these events, the Constitutional Court has been widely
perceived as politically tainted, first by Thaksin's influence and after
constitutional revision under military supervision in 2007, by his
3. See THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn
Vallinder eds.,1995).
4. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 31-49 (2004).
5. See id. at 38-49.
6. See Tom Ginsburg, The Judicialization of Administrative Governance: Causes,
Consequences and Limits, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2009). See also the
comparative studies in YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS:
LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE (2010).
7. See Ginsberg, supra, note 6, at 1.
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opponents who are allied with the military.8 In contrast to the
Constitutional Court's controversial role during this political turmoil,
the administrative courts have emerged from the political conflict with a
relatively unblemished image based on a well-publicized track record of
successful confrontations with high ranking officials and powerful
agencies. 9
In practice, courts, like the rule of law itself, derive their function
from the political purposes they serve. 10 Legal ideals and practices in
Western democracies have great appeal both for power holders seeking
to legitimize their authority and the relatively powerless who want to
hold the powerful accountable and seek wider opportunities for
themselves. Nevertheless, as China scholar Rachel Stern observes,
using formal similarities or ideological pronouncements alone as a
measure of legal development diverts our attention from "quieter shifts
more indicative of how law seeds itself in tough terrain."" Western legal
institutions and practices take hold, political scientist Dan Lev observed
after many years of studying legal systems in Southeast Asia, "only
when they make sense domestically and are adapted to domestic
purposes." 12
This study examines why courts made sense to those who
established them and how the courts' authority is being utilized. For
relatively powerless and resource-poor litigants, barriers to litigation
may be many, but when these barriers are overcome, administrative
courts exercise extraordinary influence, even when they fail to render a
decision fully vindicating a plaintiffs legal rights. Administrative courts
serve multiple functions, not only by exercising power, in the famed
words of Chief Justice Marshall, "to say what the law is,"13 but also by
decentering the concentrated power of Thailand's insular and tradition
bound ministries as well as its politicians. Binding decisions can
8. See Bjbrn Dressel, Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary?
Considerations from Recent Events in Thailand, 23 PAC. REV. 671, 676-78 (2010); see also
Eug6nie M6rieau, Thailand's Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court (199 7-
2015), 46 J. OF CONTEMP. ASIA 445 (2016).
9. See generally the overview of the administrative courts' statutory structure,
powers, and earliest landmark decisions in Peter Leyland, The Emergence of
Administrative Justice in Thailand Under the 1997 Constitution, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 230 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y.
Chen eds., 2008).
10. See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparing Legal Professions: A State Centered
Approach, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 289, 311-15 (Richard L. Abel
& Philip S. Lewis eds., 1988).
11. RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
AMBIVALENCE 211 (2013).
12. Lev, supra note 1, at 6.
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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exercise what Michael Dowdle calls concurrent jurisdiction to counter
concentrated executive or political control over policy making through
authority of their own that is directed to enforcing the rule of law.
Courts' convening power requires officials to engage other stakeholders
and to attend to the consequences of policy from other perspectives.
Finally, courts possess expressive functionality by providing a forum in
which citizens' interpretations of policy and new perspectives on state
authority can sometimes be communicated to others when political
space is limited. 14 Each of these functions create an alternative center of
power and opportunities for change. In practice, the impact of a court
system depends on a web of actors that includes judges, bureaucrats,
police, prosecutors, potential litigants, and supporting networks, and
may extend far beyond to global sources, ideological influence, and
material support.
Understanding how judges, litigants, and other actors have adapted
to the administrative courts requires context. Our examination is both
"top down" and "bottom up."15 We emphasize the courts' institutional
origins and development, and we consider how the courts' authority is
perceived and deployed by judges, potential litigants, and their
advocates. The factors influencing the mobilization of litigation and how
courts draw officials and citizens together through a web of court-
centered relationships are then discussed. Parts II and III describe the
history of the courts' origins to lay bare the political contingencies that
determined the power given the courts as the Thai state underwent
political transitions. Part II places the administrative courts in
historical perspective, describing the development of courts in Thailand
and their place in relation to the monarchy (the government's symbolic
core) and the powerful bureaucratic state. Part III describes the
constitutional and statutory powers given to the administrative courts.
Part IV describes the administrative courts in action. We present a
statistical overview of cases filed since the administrative courts opened
in 2001 and an analysis of the courts' caseload. The caseload of the
courts shows that litigation is concentrated in a few areas of
government administration, and litigants typically have a continuing
relationship with government regulators or are government officials
themselves.
More surprising is the increasing frequency of environmental rights
14. See Michael W. Dowdle, On the Regulatory Dynamics of Judicialization: The
Promise and Perils of Exploring "Judicialization" in East and Southeast Asia, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 23, 24-25,
30 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2008).
15. Our analysis benefits from Ginsburg's insightful introduction to one of the few
collections of scholarship on Asian administrative courts. Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 1.
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litigation where litigants have little familiarity with government
regulation and limited means or knowledge to litigate. In Part V, we
undertake a case study of one type of litigation's development to
illustrate the dependence of and effectiveness of litigation for rights on a
system of "support structures." 16 Thailand lacks many of the supporting
institutions and practices typical of developed Western democracies,
such as a politically savvy and powerful legal profession, a rights-
conscious judiciary, influential public and private organizations
supporting litigation for rights, and public consciousness of rights. Yet
following constitutional reform, rights-oriented litigation emerged in the
administrative courts through the efforts of a small, self-sustaining
community of activist attorneys. We describe the career of a leading
environmental litigator and his network and the mutually constructive
effects of the outcomes of this litigation on the support structures for the
courts.
A concluding Part VI draws on the foregoing analysis to address a
question posed by many Western observers of new judicial systems: Do
new administrative courts provide an alternative path for the rule of
law? We find that under both democratic and military rule, the
administrative courts have provided a means of accountability
accessible to ordinary Thai citizens. We identify factors that influenced
this possibility and provide starting points for comparisons with the
courts of other developing countries as well as with judicial systems in
developed democratic states.
THAILAND'S JUDICIARY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ITS MODERN STATE
The Kadar Toy Factory Fire
On the evening of May 10, 1993, fire swept through the shop floor of
the Kadar Toy factory in [Bangkok]. Fed by piles of fabric scraps and
aided by the absence of fire prevention systems, the fire took 188 lives
and injured 449. The fire was not Kadar's first, and government officials
shared blame for the disaster. Management malfeasance played a
primary role, but woefully inadequate oversight by ministries
contributed to the outcome. Responsibility might be extended further.
Government hostility to labor unions followed from its pro-development
policies. The International Labor Organization lectured about safe
workplaces but did little to document or prevent failures on the ground.
16. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 2-6 (1998); see also Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 8-9.
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17
The expense and uncertainty of litigation for working poor meant
that families settled for an average of $7,000.18 A Kadar-affiliated
company donated money for the education of victims' children. The
building engineer eventually lost his license. Four Kadar executives were
fined $12,280. One individual was criminally prosecuted-a worker
accused of igniting the fire with a cigarette.
There was no remedy for the government's neglect-its ineffective
oversight and failure to enforce workplace safety standards. Proposals
for reform died in committees. The government's nominal oversight
remained nominal.
Adapting to European and American Imperialism
Thailand's progressive monarchs preserved their autonomy from
nineteenth century, European colonial powers by entering into
commercial treaties, which grant extraterritorial legal rights to foreign
businesses and merchants, and by initiating a plan to create a modern
bureaucratic state with a highly centralized system of government
administration and courts. A modern state structure served dual
purposes-gaining the respect of (and independence from) foreign
powers and centralizing authority over the monarchy's diverse
domains.19 Rama V (1868-1910) created bureaucratic ministries in 1888,
placing them under the control of members of the royal family and
trusted advisors. Soon after, he developed a centralized system of civil
courts (officially Royal Courts of Justice), a project overseen by his
brother who was a lawyer trained in England. A legal code modeled on
European civil law replaced a feudal code administered regionally in
courts under the control of local nobility. 20
Two factors contributed to the long afterlife of this structure, which
centered on the legitimacy and power of the monarchy. First, Rama VI
17. See FIONA HAINES, GLOBALIZATION AND REGULATORY CHARACTER: REGULATORY
REFORM AFTER THE KADER TOY FACTORY FIRE (2005).
18. See Casey C. Grant, Case Study: The Kader Toy Factory Fire, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY (Feb. 26, 2011, 8:55 PM), http://www.iloencyclopaedia.
org/component/k2/73-39-disasters-natural-and-technological/case-study-the-kader-toy-
factory-fire.
19. See generally, CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, A HISTORY OF THAILAND (2d.
ed., 2009); see also Munger, supra note 1.
20. Rama V and his advisors chose European civil codes as a model because they were
established in the countries with extraterritorial jurisdiction and more likely to impress
them. See TAMARA Loos, SUBJECT SIAM: FAMILY, LAW, AND COLONIAL MODERNITY IN
THAILAND (2006).
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(1910-25) anticipated challenges to the monarchy's legitimacy from
modernization and eventual democratization by promulgating a state
ideology built upon both Siamese traditions and modern democratic
ideals. The three pillars of his influential formulation of a "civic
religion"-Nation, Religion, Monarchy-and the concept of the king as
caretaker of the people became deeply embedded in the fabric of modern
Thailand's politics and civic life. Following the fall of the absolute
monarchy in 1932, Thailand's rulers continued to ally themselves with
the moral power of the monarchy by inculcating the "civic religion"
through public education and symbolic observance.
Second, Thailand's dominating state administration has been more
important than its courts in determining the power of law and the
relationship between Thai citizens and the state. For much of the
twentieth century and lingering still in the twenty-first, the
government's role in economic development has been managed through
continuing patron-client relationships between powerful bureaucrats,
politicians, elites close to the monarchy, and powerful Sino-Thai
entrepreneurial families. As in other Asian bureaucratic states,
government guidance of economic development through these
relationships, rather than through enforceable rules and policies,
marginalized the role of courts and retarded development of a
meaningful rule-based regulatory system. 2 1 As private markets
expanded, domestic and foreign investors concerned about favoritism
and corruption increased the pressure for legal reforms such as new
courts to enforce the rules protecting their investments. 22
Half a century after the founding of the modern state, the overthrow
of the absolute monarchy in 1932 by European-educated commoners
introduced constitutionalism and a rule of law that emphasized
accountability. Under the absolute monarchy, Thailand's monarchs
often spoke in terms that suggested they served the people, 23 but for all
practical purposes the king spoke for the people. Robust accountability
21. Kanishka Jayasuriya, Introduction: A Framework for the Analysis of Legal
Institutions in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (Kanishka Jayasuriya, ed. 1999).
22. Specialized regulatory infrastructure was added as early as the 1970s, including
specialized civil courts, not only to improve the performance of banks and the
management of trade policy but also to protect foreign private investors. A labor court was
established in 1979 and an intellectual property court in 1996. See Vichai Ariyanuntaka,
The Judicial System in Thailand: An outlook for a New Century, in Institute for
Developing Economies, IDE-JETRO, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROUNDTABLE MEETING: LAW,
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES IN ASIA 3-4 (2000), http://www.
ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Download/Als/pdf/01.pdf.
23. See DAVID M. ENGEL, LAW AND KINGSHIP IN THAILAND DURING THE REIGN OF KING
CHULALONGKORN (MICHIGAN PAPERS ON SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA), 113-15 (1975).
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was far from the monarchy's intent. The coup's chief architect, a lawyer
trained in France, proposed creating a Council of State, like the French
Conseil d'Etat, to resolve claims of governmental power abuse. In
practice, however, the Council of State fell well short of creating
effective accessibility and oversight, and governance through powerful
networks of elites continued. 24 As limited as the early Council's
influence may have been in practical terms, ideas introduced in 1932
paved the way for development of academic learning in liberal
constitutionalism and administrative law, and further attempts to
establish administrative courts prior to the 1997 constitutional reform. 25
Military partners in the 1932 coup prevailed in the long run, and
accountability was placed on hold by authoritarian civilian governments
and military dictators who came after.
Following World War II, the United States and World Bank made
Thailand a demonstration project for capitalist development to counter
the threat of communism in Southeast Asia and ultimately supported,
as it was to do elsewhere during the Cold War, a military dictator who
promoted development of a capitalist economy. With the aid of
American funding, an expanding university system in the 1960s tapped
a growing demand for upward mobility. Universities opened the
countryside to students who previously knew little about their own
country. New ideas about society and government flowed not only from
Western-educated faculty but also from neighboring China and Vietnam
where popular revolutions and confrontations with Western powers
offered alternative models of change. On October 14, 1973, a student-led
uprising toppled an oppressive military dictator that marked a turning
point in modern Thai history. The uprising and three-year period of
vibrant democracy that followed have long been remembered in
Thailand as creating a generation (known as the October Generation) of
leaders in social change who had embraced the value of
constitutionalism and political liberalization. Of great consequence to
the future evolution of Thai constitutionalism and its judiciary, a new
vision of the rule of law was introduced that animated efforts of some to
24. The Council lacked well-institutionalized procedures, rules for adjudication, and
trained advocates, limiting its effectiveness. See TIDA CHALEECHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE
COURT: ARTICLES AND ANALYSIS MADE IN THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (1974) [in
Thai], and Bhokin Balakula, Sequence and Origins of Attempts to Create and Propose Bills
on the Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure (in
Thai), ADMIN L. J. (1996).
25. See The Administrative Courts and Office of the Administrative Courts, From the
Council of State to Administrative Court 230 (in Thai) (2010). Many judges and staff
members of the new administrative courts had served in the Office of the Council of State,
including the first President of the Administrative Court, who had previously been the
Head of the Office of the Council of State. See Balakula, supra note 24.
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use law to achieve political accountability and social change. 26
Conflicting Constitutional Legacies
By 1997, liberal elites as well as social movement leaders were
ready to entrust the political future to a government limited by
constitutional prescriptions and the will of an electorate. Concerned
most about corrupt politicians who dominated rural party politics and
Parliament, elite framers who chaired a constitutional drafting
committee hesitated to make a profound break with Thailand's political
traditions, especially the extra-constitutional authority of the monarchy.
Their initial proposal omitted any mention of administrative courts, a
likely accommodation to pressure from powerful bureaucrats and
Justice Court judges who were protective of their jurisdiction. Instead,
civil society representatives became the principal advocates for
administrative courts, which ensured the courts would become part of
the unfolding debate about political reform and accountability. 27 Once
under way, the constitutional drafting committee seriously addressed
the issues of judicial independence and effective oversight of
government officials. 28 After years of mounting internal pressures for
reform and the collapse of Thailand's economy after the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis (triggered in part by missteps at the Bank of Thailand),
the committee approved a Bill of Rights, independent courts, and
electoral democracy, fulfilling a Global North 29 vision of liberal
democracy.
A decade later in 2006, on the threshold of political paralysis caused
by the struggle between supporters and opponents of Thaksin, the
king's annual address to the judiciaries of the three court systems
reminded the judges of the constitution's vision of democratic politics
26. See KONOKRAT LERTCHOOSAKUL, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE OCTOBERISTS IN
CONTEMPORARY THAILAND: POWER AND CONFLICT AMONG FORMER LEFT WING STUDENT
ACTIVISTS IN CONTEMPORARY THAI POLITICS (2016).
27. See MICHAEL KELLY CONNORS, DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THAILAND
162-73 (2003).
28. CONST. DRAFTING ASSEMB., CONST. DRAFTING COMM'N'S MEETING REP. (1997). The
views of a 1991 constitutional drafting committee were particularly influential, and the
precise structure of the administrative courts had long been discussed among academics
and officials of the Petitions Council of the Council of State. See Balakula, supra note 24.
While the independence of the administrative courts and Constitutional Court was
discussed in 1997, interest in judicial independence redoubled after Thaksin's demise and
concern about the Constitutional Court's failure to act sooner. Compare THAILAND CONST.
OF B.E. 2540, 1997, § 3 (Thai) [hereinafter CONST. 1997] with THAILAND CONST. OF 2007 OF
B.E. 2550, 2007, § 3 (Thai) [hereinafter CONST. 2007].
29. The term "Global North" is generally understood to refer to so-called developed
countries located primarily, but by no means exclusively, the North Atlantic region.
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overseen by elites appointed to the courts. 30 The message resonated
among the judges and more widely among traditional elite and middle
classes. 31 Shortly after the king's address, the Constitutional Court,
Supreme Administrative Court, and Supreme Court of Justice
collaborated to drive Thaksin from power. This collaboration annulled
Thaksin's latest election, removed him from office, and jailed key
Election Commission members charged with fraud. These decisions
ultimately accelerated political collapse and opened the door to
Thailand's eighteenth military coup since 1932.32 Although many of the
institutions and principles established by the People's Constitution of
1997 appear to have retained their legitimacy in popular expectations
and subsequent constitutions drafted under the military's supervision,
the nature and limits of a rule of law remain deeply contested by
different interpretations of the 1997 political settlement. 33
ESTABLISHING THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS
The Organic Law of 1999
Elected on a rising tide of support for constitutional rights and
democratic rule, the new Parliament enacted an organic law
establishing the administrative courts, giving them extraordinary
power, and making them, in theory, accessible to all. 34 True to the
intentions of the framers and especially the goals of the people's
representatives who had insisted on the establishment of administrative
courts, the organic law mandated adoption of simple, low-cost
procedures to maximize access to the courts by ordinary Thai citizens.
As a result, filing a complaint against an official or agency required
little prior preparation of claims or arguments. Court personnel are
30. Thaksin, he said, had undermined that vision and a corrupt election was no
election at all. Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 19, at 270.
31. See id. at 272-275.
32. This enumeration includes eleven successful and seven unsuccessful military coups
but depends on precise definitions, and the number varies accordingly. See generally
Baker & Phongpaichit, supra note 19.
33. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of
Thailand's Postpolitical Constitution, 7 INT'L J. CONST. L. 83 (2009); Duncan McCargo &
Peeradej Tanruangporn, Branding Dissent: Nitirat, Thailand's Enlightened Jurists, 45 J.
CONTEMP. ASIA 419 (2015).
34. See Act On Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court
Procedure [Organic Law], B.E. 2542 (1999) (Thai) (administrative courts have broad
jurisdiction over government decisions and policies, equivalent to those of European and
American courts, and more remedial power at their disposal than the French courts on
which they were modelled); see also Leyland, supra note 9, at 237-38.
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directed to assist in drafting a complaint and to investigate the facts
alleged. Examination of witnesses is conducted by the administrative
court judge, which shifts the burdens of trial to the court and
eliminates, at least on paper, a need for legal representation. 35 Easy
access to a process that calls government officials to account not only
runs counter to the experience of most citizens but also violates deeply
embedded traditions of conflict avoidance and deference that may be on
the wane but remain strong among many Thai citizens. 36
Structural Limits of Administrative Courts
If the courts' organic law was clearly intended to facilitate access to
judicial oversight, other elements of court structure and organization
directly or indirectly limit the courts' influence in policy-making and
politics. The comparative political independence of the administrative
courts is, in part, an artifact of their relative insulation from political
conflict. For example, the Constitution of 2007 barred administrative
court review of agencies expressly granted power by the Constitution. 37
Further, administrative court decisions infrequently bear on the
constitutional allocation of powers. 38 The vast majority of their cases are
decided under statutory law rather than constitutional rules or
principles governing political structure. 39 The limited jurisdiction has
35. See Organic Law, supra note 34, §§ 54-66; see also id. at § 52 (the organic law
allows administrative courts to accept cases defending the public interest regardless of the
statute of limitations).
36. As simplified as access is, the court's decision processes are complex. Each case is
assigned a panel of judges. In addition, a Recording Judge is appointed to examine the
case independently, presenting conclusions to the panel after it has completed its own
analysis. This procedure is facially intended to counter possible panel bias, but because
the Recording Judge is appointed by the highest court officials, may also be intended to
check extreme acts of judicial independence. See Leyland, supra note 9, at 237-38.
37. A constitutional revision in 2007 barred administrative courts from oversight of
agencies with constitutional authority, including the Election Commission which was
suspected of corruption under Thaksin. See CONST. 2007 supra note 28, at § 223.
38. See id. at § 199; see also Leyland, supra note 9, at 238 (jealous protection of the civil
courts' jurisdiction may explain the fact administrative courts must yield to other courts
with jurisdiction over a case and, if in doubt, submit the question to a special judicial
panel for resolution).
39. While Thai legal education focuses on principles of strict statutory construction,
Thai jurisprudence permits use of a broad range of interpretive principles. Kittisak
Prokati, Faculty of Law, General Principles of Legal Usage and Interpretation [in Thai],
In Memorial of Professor Jitti Tingsabhat Academic Seminar, at 4 (Mar. 29-30, 2008)
(transcript on file with authors). In practice, the Thai Justice Courts have not used their
ample power to promote a robust culture of rights. Id. "Justice" has long meant more than
the letter of law according to Thai legal historians. Kittisak Prokati, Thai Law, A Cultural
Perspective [in Thai], The National Seminar, at 8 (The Office of National Culture, Apr. 20-
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sidelined its judges in most of the politically controversial cases of
constitutional interpretation.
The Supreme Administrative Court has decided a handful of
sensitive decisions involving political parties or the prime minister, and
while some of its decisions could be characterized as favoring powerful
politicians, royalist elites, or the military, many other important
decisions cannot.40 After expansion of the Constitutional Court's
jurisdiction over elections in 2007, that court played a greater role in
partisan politics. In contrast, the Supreme Administrative Court has
been an infrequent player in partisan conflict and has been targeted less
frequently by political critics. 41 On the contrary, administrative court
judges have expressed faithfulness to their task as guardians against
government wrongdoing, notwithstanding the pull of Thailand's cultural
traditions of accommodation and conflict avoidance. 42 Some scholars
have suggested that judicial ideology explains the administrative courts'
greater apparent faithfulness to the rule of law,43 but judges on both
courts are from similar backgrounds and are chosen by similar, elite-
controlled processes. 44 Ideology, though undoubtedly influential in any
22, 1995) (transcript on file with authors). In a 2008 seminar on the administrative courts,
Supreme Administrative Court President Ackaratorn expressed his belief in the
judiciary's commitment to protection of rights. Ackaratorn Chularat, A New Role for
Administrative Courts of Thailand [in Thai], in Rechstaat in Thai Society Annual
Seminar, at 11 (Dec. 16, 2008) (transcript on file with authors). In practice, the Thai
Justice Courts have not used their ample power to promote a robust culture of rights. See
Michael Kelly Connors, Ambivalent About Human Rights: Thai Democracy, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ASIA 103 (Thomas W.D. Davis & Brian Galligan, eds., 2011).
40. See Leyland, supra note 9, at 242-246.
41. Senior academics and judges have suggested that allegations of bias themselves
may reflect the increasingly partisan political climate. Somkit Lertpaithoon, A New Role
for Administrative Courts of Thailand [in Thai], in Rechstaat in Thai Society Annual
Seminar, at 60 (Dec. 16, 2008) (transcript on file with authors).
42. Administrative court judge Prasart Pongsuwan expressed this view. "The Thai
Supreme Administrative Court is considered new, and since its inception, Thailand has
been under one-sided government. Therefore, it could be mistakenly perceived that the
Administrative Court is an opponent of Thaksin's administration . . . If you wait long
enough, you will see that the Court is the enemy of every government ... There is no such
thing as a 'new role' for the administrative courts. The role has always been the same old
role which is controlling the executive branch or government action. This is something
that governments do not like. This job is considered a sin [uninsm] to those working in the
administrative court. Before I came to be a judge at the administrative court, I had no
idea what it would be like. But after I became an administrative judge, I now know what
that role is." Id. at 38.
43. See Duncan McCargo, Competing Notions of Judicialization in Thailand, 36
CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 417, 423 (2014).
44. Compare CONST. 1997, supra note 28, § 277, with CONST. 2007, supra note 28, §§
204, 206. See also Organic Law, supra note 34, §§ 13, 18. In addition, administrative court
nominations are made by a select body serving as the Judicial Commission of the
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court system, does not necessarily explain differences in political
function. 45 Yet, here too, there is no sharp division between the
responsibilities of the Constitutional Court and administrative courts.
While administrative courts have a more limited mandate, in principle,
they extend the rule of law to the highest levels of government.
Independent of framers' intentions and judicial ideology,
institutional structure limits the administrative courts' impact on the
routines and customs of policy-making in powerful ministries. Thai
ministries present special challenges for judicial oversight. Within many
ministries, personal influence still commands greater deference from
officials than court decisions. 46 As a novel institution struggling for a
place within Thailand's traditions of political and social influence,
however, Thai courts have limited political power support for their legal
authority. The influence of international investors empowers friendly
politicians and domestic ministries with jurisdiction over business and
trade to the detriment of ministries and the courts that oversee
domestic policies protecting communities or the environment. 47 Policy-
Administrative Courts. See CONST. 2007, supra note 28, § 226, while Constitutional Court
nominations are subject to oversight by a committee of the Senate, a body specifically
constituted to offset populist political pressure. See CONST. 2007, supra note 28, § 206.
45. See Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 75, 75 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
Further, notwithstanding perceptions of news media to the contrary, the U.S. State
Department reports that, except in cases the military junta has identified as matters of
national security, a label it applies quite liberally, Thai courts enforce the law and respect
rights to a fair trial, suggesting that on the whole the judiciary has retained its
independence. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY & H.R. AND LAB.,
THAILAND 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 9 (2017), https://www.state.gov/documents
/organization/277365.pdf.
46. Favoritism by Thai officials, also termed corruption, is widely reported on business
security websites and is a factor in Thailand's relatively poor ranking by Transparency
International. See Thailand Corruption Report, GAN BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION
PORTAL, (last updated Sept. 2017), https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-
profiles/thailand/; see also Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption-perceptions
index_2016#table. Reports and rankings are based on opinions and public perceptions
rather than actual incidents, although there is no shortage of anecdotes about corruption
at the highest levels, including reports involving high ranking members of the current
military regime, which has claimed that ending corruption is an important part of its
mission. See Pavin Chachavalpongpun, The Latest Thai Corruption Scandal is Causing
Problems for the Ruling Junta, WASH. POST, (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/01/23/the-latest-thai-corruption-scandal-is-causing-
problems-for-the-ruling-junta/?noredirect=on&utmterm=.ba6ed5a63f479 (Thailand's slow
moving administrative court process may also motivate attempts to influence officials
directly).
47. For an illuminating case study of the capacity of politicians, international business
and business-oriented ministries to thwart a path-breaking environmental remedy orders
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making ministries often claim they lack the power and budget to enforce
policies directly and that they must rely on other ministries or local
officials to carry them out. 48 Thai ministries established a century or
earlier under the control of powerful royal overseers continue in the
modern era to be insular, competitive, and unresponsive. 49
Realities on the ground that negate the value of the courts'
simplified procedures must be added to the legacies of institutional
structure and jurisprudence that influence the courts' emerging capacity
to uphold the rule of law. Despite ambivalent intentions of a divided
elite and institutional barriers to effective use of the courts, rising
caseloads show Thai citizens have responded to the invitation to
challenge government actions. If administrative courts have limited
power to enter into political controversies that concern the structure of
state power, they seem to have been effective in a range of more limited
controversies with ministry officials and less visible, but more
numerous, local government controversies. 50
THAI ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS AT WORK
Who Uses the Courts?
There are both cultural and practical barriers to mobilizing courts in
a society where historically courts have been viewed remote and law not
well understood. Most ordinary Thai citizens have little knowledge of
the century-old civil courts and avoid using them to resolve conflict.
Administrative courts are new and unfamiliar to most lawyers. As we
explain further in Part V, after overcoming these barriers, even a simple
and relatively uncontroversial claim may require persuasion to move a
bureaucratic and, in some regions, overworked court staff to proceed
by the administrative courts see Sarah Bishop, The Thai Administrative Court and
Environmental Conflicts: A Case Study of Map Ta Phut, Rayong (2011) (published MA
thesis) (on file with the Australian National University).
48. Interview with the former Deputy Director General of the Pollution Control
Department, Dr. Vijarn Simachaya (Dec. 25, 2012); see also The Nation, Court Overturns
Massive Compensation Ruling for Klong Dan Project, THE NATION (Mar. 7, 2018, 1:00
PM), http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/national/30340348.
49. See James Ockey, State, Bureaucracy, and Polity in Modern Thai Politics, 34 J.
CONTEMP. ASIA 143, 146 (2004).
50. Thailand first allowed class actions in 2015. See Act TO AMEND THE CIVIL
PROCEDURE CODE, B.E. 2558 (2015) [hereinafter "The Act"]. Environmental litigation
in the civil courts has become the testing ground. See Aaron Le Marquer, Thailand
Certifies First Class Action, TILLEKE & GIBBINS (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.tilleke.com/resources/thailand-certifies-first-class-action.
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with the case and persist through multiple judicial hearings. 5 1 Who,
then, mobilizes the authority of the administrative courts?
Rates of Litigation
Steadily rising administrative court caseloads show that the
administrative courts have been well-used from their inception and that
their attraction has increased. Since the administrative court system
opened its doors in 2001, it has accepted thousands of new cases per
year, exceeding 10,000 new cases in 2016. Diagram 1 shows the number
of new cases filed in the administrative courts from 2001 to 2016. For
the first ten years, the administrative courts averaged less than 5,000
new cases each year, but since 2011 new cases have been filed at an
increasing rate and have averaged more than 8,500 over the last seven
years.
Diagram 1: Number of New Administrative Court Cases by Year 200 1-
2016
Number of All New Administrative Court Cases Per Year
Presidentterm: (Status, Bahelor PhD country pr-c -mpoymenlt before Admin Ct )
0 2000- 2010:Ackratorniretire~d, LBThai.,sat, kaly/,, un- t ate o , ffi,,
4,304 4.309 4.38
Dec[Lu~O1 k & -frt !-
0bb 4,7 4,289 -';1
3A42
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Source: All tables and diagrams based on data from the Administrative
Court Website, http://www.admincourt.go.th/admin court/site/03
stattotal.html (last visited on Feb. 13, 2018).
51. A general description of the administrative court litigation process can be found in
nost. ¶m-d, anlna , mennina [Administrative Case Trial,
Administrative Judges: Deciding Administrative Cases] [in Thai], available at
https://oer.learn.in.th/search-detail/ZipDownload/53641. Our characterizations in the text
were supported by interviews with administrative court litigators conducted between 2009
and 2017.
0,776
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Litigation rates per hundred thousand citizens, which are a more
meaningful baseline for comparisons, tell the same story (see Diagram
2).
Thailand experienced frequent political disruptions over this time
period, but there is no evidence connecting political disruption to
fluctuations in the rate of litigation. Neither disruptive political
succession nor violent protest bear an obvious relationship to
fluctuations plotted in Diagrams 1 and 2. Three such events occurred
between 2001 and 2010: the 2006 Military Coup, removal of a Thaksin
supported Prime Minister in 2008, and extreme political violence
associated with suppression of a Red Shirt (pro-Thaksin) protest in
2010. The overall litigation rate steadily rose over the entire period.
Political disruptions continued between 2011 and 2017. Prime Minister
Yingluck's term was disrupted by protests and ended in 2014 when she
was removed from office by court decision, coincident with a second
military coup. In contrast to the first period, litigation rates rose
sharply and unevenly, but without a clearer connection or rationale, it
would be hard to associate these changes with Thailand's political
disruptions. Over the entire period, important changes occurred in the
structure of the administrative courts, and we consider this a promising
explanation for changes in use of the courts. 52
Diagram 2: Litigation Rates by Year (per 100,000 citizens) 2001-2016
Litigation Rate by Year (per 100,000 citizens)
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52. Over the span of sixteen years, the Supreme Administrative Court has been led by
three different presidents, Ackaratorn Chularat, Hassawut Withitwiriyakul, and Piya
Patangta, all of whom have been viewed as "activists" for their dedication to upholding the
rule of law and were members of the majority ruling against the government in the Map
Ta Phut case. See Bishop, supra note 47.
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Types of Cases
Much government activity concerns policies that affect the entire
population, such as maintaining a power grid, conducting foreign
affairs, or creating policies for environmental protection. Most Thai
administrative court litigants, however, have a specific relationship
with government defined by: government employment; a government
contract; a franchise, license, lease, or concession; enrollment in a public
university; or use of government health care. It is little surprise, then,
that most cases are brought by individuals with such relationships (see
Diagram 3). Personnel cases are most numerous and ranged up to 37
percent of the entire case load in 2009 (see Diagram 3), followed by
property repossession and similar lease or contract-related cases and
regulation of buildings and land use. Not only do these litigants have a
clearly defined stake in a relationship with the Thai government but
they are also likely to be wealthier and more educated than the average
Thai citizen and have greater confidence dealing with officials. 53
Diagram 3: Percentage of Cases by Type by Year 2001-201554
Percentage of Administrative Court Caseload by Category and Year
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53. For example, frequent litigants such as government employees and local
government officials may view the courts' plaintiff-friendly procedures as little more than
a grievance mechanism for their continuing relationship with a government institution.
54. Prior to 2016, new cases submitted to the Administrative Court were reported in
nine broad categories. In December 2015, a tenth category was added called "Fiscal and
Budget Discipline." At the end of 2016, only sixteen new cases were reported under this
new category, for consistency we have combined these with the category "Others" in 2016;
see Judicial Review Chart Entirety Since Opening, THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT (current
through Aug. 31, 2018), http://www.admincourt.go.th/admincourt/site/03stattotal.html.
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Tables 1 & 2: Number of Cases by Type by Year 2001-2016
Topic 2001 '200(2 20W): 2(0 2005 - 2006)( 2007)- 2008,,
Personnel Administration,
Discipline, Benefits, and
ProfessionalInstitutions 1,033 1,001 944 980 1,094 1,151 1,248 1,161
Property Repossession Violation
and Other Responsibility 1,080 553 710 620 1,039 993 1,070 674
Building Control, Resources and
Environment 838 512 622 523 608 899 696 582
Parcel and Administrative
Contracts 455 562 831 524 647 618 770 768
Governing and Government
Administration 293 386 419 412 338 638 365 305
Land and National Property 402 336 205 161 157 138 90 95
Transportation, Agriculture,
Commerce and Industrial 124 187 119 92 101 145 130 157
Education, Religious, Social and
Culture 138 109 107 110 100 151 173 160
Others 1,019 658 352 220 296 368 449 375
Topc 00 2Q10) 2011 2012 2(Q13; 20141 20157 2016(
Personnel Administration,
Discipline, Benefits, and
Professional Institutions 1,969 1,122 1,451 1,693 1,474 1,392 2,207 2,563
Property Repossession Violation
and Other Responsibility 945 818 950 1,672 1,440 1,490 1,079 2,236
Building Control, Resources and
Environment 589 562 1,232 2,754 2,179 697 1,043 1,372
Parcel and Administrative
Contracts 721 787 812 842 887 857 889 1,361
Governing and Government
Administration 337 347 631 400 451 270 280 396
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Land and National Property 145 227 176 246 406 180 1,192 1,029
Transportation, Agriculture,
Commerce and Industrial 133 153 143 166 1,643 275 325 456
Education, Religious, Social and
Culture 132 158 136 163 819 576 154 150
Others 299 454 396 569 419 644 743 1213
Regional differences in litigation rates may be related to the
geographic distribution of particular types of cases. The central region,
containing Bangkok and its suburbs, is the location of the largest
government agencies and their supporting services, typically by far the
highest litigation rates of any region. (See Diagram 4). Differences in
regional litigation rates may also have to do with the administrative
court systems' changing structure.
Diagram 4: Litigation rates by Region by Year 2001-2016
Litigation Rate by Region
Rate: x per 100,000 citizens
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Court System Structure
The administrative court system opened in 2001 with just a fraction
of the authorized regional courts in place. The Administrative Court
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Legislative Act of 1999 authorized sixteen regional first-instance
administrative courts throughout Thailand-two in the central region,
six in the northeast region, one in the east, three in the north, and four
in the south.55 The first set of regional administrative courts opened in
2001 in Chiang Mai (north), Songkhla (south), and Nakorn Ratchasrima
(northeast). 56 New regional courts opened every few years, and
currently, eleven of the projected sixteen regional courts have been
established.57 The dispersion and small number of regional
administrative courts created unanticipated barriers to litigation. Even
though accessible administrative courts were established in the
expectation that litigants would present their own claims and give
evidence at subsequent hearings, a litigant of modest means found
travel and board costs of litigation at a location far from home a great
burden.5 8 Slow expansion of the regional court system has undoubtedly
reduced these costs for some litigants, which may be a factor in the
gradual upward trend in the rate of litigation.
Between 2011 and 2016, three specialized divisions were created:
the Environmental Division (2011), the Personnel Administration
Division (2014), and the Fiscal and Budget Discipline Division (2015).59
In 2014 when the Personnel Administration Division was established,
then president of the Supreme Administrative Court, Dr. Hassawut
Withitwiriyakul, suggested that the specialized division was a response
to the large volume of personnel cases, which often creates a bottleneck
that needs to be processed quickly. 60 The new division decreased delays
55. See Organic Law, supra note 34, at § 94.
56. See Administrative Court Structure, THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT (last visited Jan.
12, 2018), http://www.admincourt.go.th/admincourt/site/O1structure.html.
57. Other regional courts opened in 2002 (Khon Kaen and Phitsanulok), 2003 (Rayong)
and Nakorn Srithammarat), 2010 (Udon Thani), 2011 (Ubon Ratchathani), 2015
(Phetburi), and 2016 (Nakorn Sawan). See id.
58. The authors conducted several interviews with litigators whose clients fund travel
and maintenance to attend hearings-a nearly insurmountable burden. See Part V.
59. See Announcement on Establishment of the Environmental Division, 128 ROYAL
THAI GOVT GAZETTE, Part 54a B.E. 2554, July 4, at 16; Announcement of Establishment of
the Personnel Administration Division, Vol. 131 ROYAL THAI GOVT GAZETTE, Part 12a,
B.E. 2557 Jan 24, at 4; and Announcement of Establishment of the Fiscal and Budget
Discipline Division, Vol. 132 ROYAL THAI GOVT GAZETTE, Part 105a B.E. 2558, Nov. 6, at
16.
60. See Office of the Administrative Court, Administrative Court's Performance Update
on 14th Anniversary, ADMINISTRATIVE COURT NEWS, (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://admincourt.go.th/ADMINCOURT/upload/webcms/Oldnews/attach/news-attach/2015
/03/21.pdf; Sakrin Khemtong, 13th Anniversary ofAdministrative Court - Too Many Illegal
Transfer Cases, KRUNGTHEP BUSINESS NEWS, (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.
bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/568669 (the Division has adopted procedures permitting
the head of the panel assigned to the case to issue interim orders that allow the
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but also contributed to a sharp rise in the amount of personnel litigation
(see Diagram 5). Yet volume alone may not have triggered this decision.
Personnel cases dominated the court docket from the beginning, but
immediately prior to opening its new division, the administrative courts
were required to decide several well-publicized cases involving high
profile officials appointed by a prior administration. By opening a
specialized personnel division, the Judicial Council of the
Administrative Courts may have hoped to limit future political fallout
through swift resolution by judges skilled in routine processing of
personnel matters. 61 The judiciary's sensitivity to the political
consequences of delay is also underscored by its reasons for establishing
the Fiscal and Budget Discipline Division in 2015. Only sixteen cases
were filed in this division in 2016, but judges who have spoken publicly
about the reasons for the new division have said that the mishandling of
funds (identified by the Office of Auditor General) created politically
sensitive controversies over corruption, budget allocation, and political
reputation that must be resolved quickly. 62
government to function or preserve an employee's rights while a final resolution is
reached).
61. The especially sensitive case of Thawil Pleinsri, a political appointee of the
previous regime and transferred by Prime Minister Yingluck, Thaksin's sister, shortly
after she took office, was decided just a few days before Personnel Administration Division
opened on March 10, 2014. See Case Closed on Thawil Pleinsri's Case: Opening of
Administrative Court's Personnel Administration Division, MANAGER ONLINE, (Mar. 19,
2014), https://mgronline.com/crime/detail/9570000031053; Sakrin Khemtong, 13th
Anniversary of Administrative Court - Too Many Illegal Transfer Cases, KRUNGTHEP
BUSINESS NEWS, (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/568669.
62. As administrative court Judge Wisanu Wanranyu explained, "The new division is
intended to serve as an 'Express Lane' to help expedite this type of case. Otherwise this
type of case will be considered a General Administrative case, and it would be some time
before the trial could begin." Keasinee Tangkiew, The Fiscal and Budget Discipline
Division of the Administrative Court - A New Mechanism to Fight Corruption,
KOMCHADLUEK, (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.komchadluek.net/news/politic/218064.
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Diagram 5: Number of Personnel Administration and Environmental
Cases by Year 2001-2016
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Environmental Litigation
Environmental cases, like personnel cases, have been slowly
increasing in number (and rate), but unlike the latter, the sharp
increase in environmental cases occurred after the opening of the new
Environmental Division in 2011 (see Diagrams 5 & 6). The timing
suggests a very different interaction between the administrative courts
and their social and political environment. In 1992, Thailand adopted
environmental protection laws modeled on international standards, but
the law was seldom enforced due both to practical barriers to civil court
litigation for damages and to the absence of an effective means of
oversight. Accessible administrative courts offered a solution to both
problems. It is unsurprising that non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) representing rural communities affected by Thailand's
ambitious land and resource development projects were among the
primary advocates for the courts and, in some cases supported by the
same NGOs, among the first plaintiffs in environmental litigation in the
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administrative courts. Environmental litigation by other groups brought
together by the possibility of litigation is a new phenomenon examined
in Part V.
As early as 2005, after a U.N. Development Project meeting in
Bangkok to promote more environmental courts, Thailand's Justice
Courts established a specially trained Green Bench. By contrast,
administrative court judges received little specialized training in
handling complex environmental claims until establishment of the
Environmental Division in 2011.63 The catalyst was likely a first-
instance administrative court's electrifying decision in 2009 that
temporarily shut down the Map Ta Phut industrial estate, one of
Thailand's largest, due to the government's alleged failure to enforce
statutory air quality standards and to implement a constitutional
provision requiring community consultation. The case and its aftermath
had two consequences: an immediate upsurge in environmental cases
soon after the decision and exposure of evidentiary and jurisprudential
weaknesses in a prestigious panel's handling of the case. Although the
decision was hailed within Thailand and abroad as a leading edge of the
rule of law in Thailand,64 some domestic critics claimed to find
numerous weaknesses in the statutory and constitutional
interpretations underlying the decision, 65 and much of the holding's
sting was removed by the same court's rapid turnaround. The same
intermediate court exonerated most of the companies a year later, and
the intermediate court's decree was weakened further on appeal to the
Supreme Administrative Court. Both consequences were likely factors
in the decision to create the Environmental Division.
63. Bishop, supra note 47, at 20.
64. See Dieter C. Umbach, Professor, Remarks made extemporaneously at the 4th
International Conference on "Law in the Changing World" at Thammasat University (Dec.
9, 2009).
65. See Interview with Worachet Pakeerat: "Extreme" view against the Supreme
Administrative Court's Decision on Map Ta Put, PRACHATAI (Dec. 12, 2009)
https://prachatai.com/journal/2009/12/27076.
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Diagram 6: Environmental Cases by Year 2001-2016
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Decisions with Consequences
Although the numbers and types of cases provide some sense of the
administrative courts' presence and influence, we have presented no
direct evidence that they are an effective means for responding to claims
against the government. 66 In addition to the 2010 Map Ta Phut
Industrial Estate decision mentioned earlier, a number of high profile
decisions reversing important government decisions or programs have
received favorable attention from scholars. 67 Although the most notable
of these were cases brought against Thaksin-era privatization policies
and therefore subject to partisan interpretation, a stronger case for the
non-partisan influence of the courts can be made by noting that
governments (prior to the 2014 coup) controlled by pro-Thaksin and
anti-Thaksin politicians have reversed high-level administrative
appointments.
66. Part V of this article adds some depth to our argument that administrative courts
have mattered.
67. See Leyland, supra note 9, at 242-48.
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During the period between the military coups in 2006 and 2014,
conflict between political factions became intense, often spilling over
into street violence. Holdover incumbents in important bureaucratic
positions were targeted for transfer by incoming regimes. Three high
profile transfer cases during this period support the perception of
administrative court political independence. 68 Each case involved
demoting a high ranking official appointed by the prior political regime,
and each tested the limits of executive discretion to decide based on
political ideology while ignoring the laws governing transfers. 69 All
three cases were decided against the incoming regime that attempted to
remove the official. The administrative court has posted numerous
notable decisions holding national or local officials accountable on its
website with brief descriptions of the remedies granted. 70 These cases
suggest that the administrative courts can resist pressure from elected
politicians.
A measure of the administrative courts' resistance to institutional
pressure from a different direction, Thailand's powerful bureaucrats, is
the court's growing use by businesses to challenge policy decisions. In
the past, litigation by businesses challenging power of bureaucrats or
politicians was rare, unlike the United States where there is a long
history of corporate litigation contesting government regulation.71
Presently, businesses in Thailand seem increasingly willing to litigate,
68. See Jadul Apichartbutr us. PM Samak in 2008 (Supreme Administrative Court
Ordered to Return Jadul's Position), MANAGER ONLINE (Jul. 25, 2011),
http://www.mgronline.com/Politics/Viewnews.aspx?NewsID=9540000091717; Peerapol
Tritasawit us. PM Abhisit in 2009 (Administrative Court Ruled Illegal Transfer of
Peerapol Made by Abhisit and Suthep), MANAGER ONLINE (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://www.mgronline.com/Politics/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9550000141180; Thawil
Pleinsri vs. PM Yingluck in 2011 (Case Closed on Thawil Pleinsri's Case: Opening of
Administrative Court's Personnel Administration Division), MANAGER ONLINE (Mar. 19,
2014), https://mgronline.com/crime/detail/9570000031053 (although each case was
significant domestically, the third received the greatest attention in the international
press because it involved Prime Minister Yingluck, Thaksin's sister, at a time of
increasing resistance to her Red Shirt government, and shortly before overthrow of her
government by the military).
69. The statutory law permitted reassignment but only to a position commensurate
with the rank and experience of the official, a principle the court said was violated in each
case. For a summary of all three cases see Personnel Administrative Cases (Jadul-
Peerapol-Thawil) Decided on Same Principle, ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
http://admincourt.go.th/admincourt/upload/webcms/Academic/Academic_150216_142145.p
df (Last Visited Jul. 10, 2018).
70. See Resolution of the Judicial Council of the Administrative Courts Regarding "Hot
Suits," ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, http://www.admincourt.go.th/admincourt/upload/webcms/
News/News_230516_100755.pdf.
71. See ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: How AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON
THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018).
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not only defensively but also affirmatively to limit bureaucrats' use of
discretionary powers. 72 A third source of institutional pressure is the
ever-present military and the current junta. While legal confrontations
with the military and police have taken place mostly in the Justice
Courts and military courts in cases in which defendants have been
accused of political crimes, administrative courts have been willing to
rule against the military government in a few cases within their
jurisdiction. 73
CONTENTIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
Klity Creek 1967-2017
In 1967, Komol Lead Concentrates Co. Ltd. opened its mine in
Kanachanburi Province at a location deep in the Thugyai-Nareasuan
Forest and demped its lead bearing waste in Klity Creek. The Creek's
wildlife, vegetation, and clean water sustained the way of life of the
Karen, one of Thailand's isolated ethnic minorities living along its
banks. In 1998 as the NGO movement expanded, organizers came to the
village and assisted its inhabitants in contacting the media to make
Karen's grievances public. Thai ministries showed up in force. The
Department of Mineral Resources temporarily closed the mine. The
Pollution Control Department (PCD) took samples and banned further
use of the creek water, which cut off the Karen from their livelihood. An
inter-agency committee resolved that remediation should be undertaken,
but nothing was done.
The Karen, with NGO assistance, brought the dilemma to the post-
constitutional network of lawyers for social causes. A civil court case was
filed in 2003 by 151 Karen who sought damages for injuries dating from
1967, future medical costs, and the cost of sustenance during
72. See recent litigation by a group of milk producers association to block the
government milk board's recent order regulating the supply of milk. Crowd of School Milk
Producers Protest at Minister of Agriculture, NAEWNA (Mar. 31, 2018),
http://www.naewna.com/politic/330418 (part V of this article examines the role of NGO
attorneys who, unlike their corporate counterparts, are administrative court litigation
trail blazers, a role acknowledged by Bangkok's global law firms); see also Marquer, supra
note 50.
73. See, e.g, CROSS CULTURAL FOUNDATION, https://voicefromthais.wordpress.com
(discussing a decision upholding administrative court jurisdiction over legal wrongs
committed by government officers acting under color of martial law); Online Reporters,
Thaksin's Passport Petition Rejected, KRUNGTHEP BUSINESS NEWS (May 1, 2018, 1:20 PM),
https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/1455990/thaksins-passport-petition-rejected
(rejecting Thaksin's appeal to have his passport restored but granting the appeal of a
Thaksin aide).
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rehabilitation of the Creek. The Karen rejected a modest judgment in
their favor in 2006 and appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice. In
2016, the Supreme Court affirmed and increased the damages award to
36 million baht or about $8,000 for each of the plaintiffs.
A second case brought in administrative court in 2004 was based on
an innovative argument advanced by NGO lawyers who argued that
broad statutory language and seldom used regulations not only gave the
PCD authority but also created a duty to order the polluter to undertake
rehabilitation. Four years later, after multiple pleadings and other
delays, the administrative court held that the PCD had failed to
investigate the Karen claims. The administrative court also held that the
PCD had a responsibility to remedy the pollution by ordering the
company to rehabilitate Klity Creek. The PCD was ordered to pay for
costs of its delay. The company appealed, delaying final decision by the
Supreme Administrative Court until 2013 when final judgment was
entered. The final decree ordered the PCD to develop a company
rehabilitation plan and to pay each of the thirteen plaintiffs $5,402.
In 2018, twenty years after Klity Creek was first brought to the PCD's
attention, the agency has not completed its remediation plan.
Judicial "Support Structures"
Part IV identified an unlikely class of litigants who lacked
experience and possessed few resources: namely rural and urban
community members who lost land, water, air quality, and sometimes
their livelihood as a result of environmental damage primarily from
business and infrastructure development projects in which the
government collaborated or had enabled through licensing, franchising,
or regulatory oversight. For those injured by such projects,
administrative courts promised a remedy for collective grievances
unavailable through political representation. As previously described,
administrative court procedures were simplified to make low-cost
litigation possible without a lawyer. A petition initiating a case required
only a simple statement of facts, and court personnel assumed the
burdens of investigating, documenting facts, and applying law. In
practice, these informal procedures exacerbated disadvantages of
wealth, education, and experience in resolving conflicts for litigants like
these. An administrative court judge must decide whether a complaint
is valid before proceeding. Both law and facts are important at this
stage, especially when a controversy raises unfamiliar questions of law
or requires subtle characterization of facts to persuade a judge to accept
the matter for decision. Judges have often required multiple responsive
filings, a process that, in a case like the Klity Creek litigation, could
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require years and might even be delayed by the judge to increase
pressure for settlement. Further, the cost of multiple trips to a distant
courthouse could well be prohibitive for a poor family. When the trial
judge's investigation is complete, a panel of judges must examine the
evidence and decide the merits of the claim, but not before comparing its
conclusions with those of a single judge appointed by a separate process
who also prepares a decision. At each point in this potentially lengthy
process a litigant's participation might influence the outcome with the
help of an experienced and skilled advocate.
Law training in Thailand, as in many civil law jurisdictions,
emphasizes remaining within the letter of the statutory law rather than
seeking "justice behind the law," in the words of one environmental
advocate. Precise interpretation of statutory requirements can
strengthen the rule of law and reinforce the legal obligations of those
who might otherwise ignore them. Thus, some provisions of Thailand's
1992 Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental
Quality Act 74 and the ministry regulations that have been routinely
ignored might be enforced by a judiciary trained in strict statutory
interpretation. But some key constitutional and statutory concepts are
new to Thailand, and they require innovative interpretations.
Provisions of the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions, which created rights to
be informed and to participate in government decisions affecting the
environment of a community, provide principles but not precise
instructions to ministries. Flexible standards governing ministry
discretion under administrative law are new to judges not accustomed
to creating policy from broad principles. Even favorably inclined judges
are on a steep learning curve.75 Court staff, burdened by large numbers
of cases and the demands of investigation and development of each one,
lack time and training to fill these gaps. 76 Subtleties of substantive law
are beyond the understanding of citizens who, lacking an attorney,
would have to bring them forward on their own.
In general, Thailand lacks support for rights advocacy.77 A culture of
74. See Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, B.E.
2535 (1992) (Thai), trans. available at http://portal.mrcmekong.org/assets/documents/Thai-
Law/Enhancement-and-Conservation-of-National-Environmental-Quality-Act-(1992).pdf.
75. E.g., id. at § 35 ("It shall be the duty of all government agencies concerned to take
actions within their powers and functions that are necessary for effective implementation
of the Environmental Quality Management Plan . . . .") Ministries have claimed that
neither the Act nor ministry regulation provide a precise requirement for action, an
"omission" the courts have been forced to consider in course of environmental litigation.
76. See Bishop, supra note 47, at 30-35.
77. Political scientist Charles Epp's comparative study of rights advocacy emphasizes
the importance of "support structures" such as an independent, "organizationally adept,"
politically savvy, and adversarial legal profession, private funders and legal aid
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rights may be growing but remains weak. The Constitutional Court
failed to develop the constitution's extensive bill of rights.78 Other than
members of a self-sustaining network of social cause lawyers that
formed after the October 1973 uprising, the legal profession provides
little support to lawyers who take up social causes.79 Other comparative
studies show that movements for rights may take hold when strong
international pressure make rulers receptive to human rights.8 0
International movements for human and environmental rights have had
influence in Thailand, but their role has been limited by the absence of a
stronger domestic advocacy.8 1
Notwithstanding litigation barriers and the absence of strong
domestic advocacy for rights in general, Thailand has developed a
system of support for environmental litigation, which resulted in
remarkable administrative court decisions against government officials
and entire ministries.
The First Environmental Litigator
An international environmental movement has grown steadily to
address concerns about spillovers from development affecting valuable
resources to the international community. 82 When the first international
organizations, and rights consciousness among members of the public and constitutional
court judges. See Epp, supra note 16. (Epp's list is notable for its Anglo-American centrism
and the absence of similar institutional features in many developing legal systems).
78. See James R. Klein, The Battle for the Rule of Law in Thailand: The Constitutional
Court of Thailand, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THAILAND: THE PROVISIONS AND
THE WORKING OF THE COURT (Amara Raksasataya & James R. Klein eds., 2003)
(discussion of the early years of the Constitutional Court).
79. See Munger, supra note 1. (unlike the legal profession in the Anglo-American
tradition, lawyers as profession in Thailand are fragmented and weak, and its elite
members avoid politics and confrontations with the government. Advocacy for rights is not
supported by a strong criminal defense bar, legal services organizations or domestic
foundations).
80. See, e.g., Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing Law Out of Power:
Investing in Human Rights as an Alternative Political Strategy, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND
THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); Margaret
Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1997).
81. See Frank W. Munger, Globalization, Investing in Law and the Careers of Lawyers
for Social Causes: Taking on Rights in Thailand, 53 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 745 (2008-2009).
82. The global commons include shared resources: air quality, water supply, pollution
from pesticides and mining, deforestation, marine eco-system mismanagement, and
general degradation of environmental quality. In actuality, local environmental conflicts
often concern the unequal impact of development on historically disadvantaged
communities, which exacerbates political and social inequalities and raises questions
about governance. For example, the Pak Mun Dam in northeastern Thailand-an infamous
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advocates for environmental rights appeared, Thailand's NGO
community was already deeply involved in supporting community
resistance to burdens imposed on them by development, but not by
means of litigation.83
As the popular movement for constitutional reform peaked in the late
1990s, Surachai Throngam, the son of a soldier and a curry rice street
vendor, joined three other activist lawyers to form the first private law
firm in Thailand dedicated to social causes. Administrative courts
changed everything for these lawyers by giving them new strategies,
new careers, and, unexpectedly, a new professional identity. Surachai
filed his first administrative court case shortly after the courts opened
in 2001. By persuading the judges to interpret their power broadly, he
won an unprecedented judgment ordering Thailand's atomic energy
agency to use its discretionary authority to protect the public from
negligent disposal of radioactive waste by issuing more effective
standards. His case tested the administrative courts' willingness, in his
words, to "push the law" by interpreting general constitutional and
statutory principles ignored in practice by ministries responsible for
preventing such threats to the public. In a parallel civil court case
against the private waste disposal company, he won damages for the
community, a remedy seldom sought by individuals because of the
litigation expenses and the low price of settlement. Tandem victories in
the two court systems were important because of the connection
between government ministries and private industry. His success has
not been lost on attorneys in private practice, who can earn a fee
financed by a damage award, as well as other social cause attorneys. 84
World Bank funded dam project in Thailand--is one among many large-scale water
management projects that displaced entire villages, destroyed local culture, and damaged
ecosystems that sustained local populations. See Chris Sneddon & Coleen Fox, Struggles
Over Dams as Struggles for Justice: The World Commission on Dams (WCD) and Anti-
Dam Campaigns in Thailand and Mozambique, 21 Soc'Y & NAT. RES. 625 (2006).
83. The language used by local leaders might include claims for "rights," rights they
believed protected by the new Constitution, but they were defined in concrete terms-
protecting a customary way of life, sustaining local ecology, their strong desire for
equality, and, especially after 1997, recognition that government had responsibilities to
them. Interviews were conducted by the authors with numerous organizers between 2006-
2014. See Prudhisan Jumbala & Maneerat Mitprasat, Non-Governmental Development
Organisations: Empowerment and Environment, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN THAILAND:
DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION (Kevin Hewison ed., 1997); Philip Hirsch, The Politics of
Environment: Opposition and Legitimacy, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN THAILAND:
DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION (Kevin Hewison ed., 1997).
84. Only a few have pursued the harder and less remunerative path of innovative
administrative court litigation, and until 2015, when the civil procedure code was
amended to permit class actions, the effort required to litigate on behalf of large numbers
of individual plaintiffs continued to limit their interest.
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In 2001, an American foundation seeking corporate philanthropic
opportunities to fund anti-pollution litigation sought suggestions for a
recipient in Thailand. Although Surachai's inability to speak any
foreign language was considered a limitation by his colleagues, he was
chosen by peers to lead this project because of his unique litigation
experience and his many connections with NGOs, academics, and
human rights lawyers. As Director of EnLAW,85 Surachai became what
was perhaps Thailand's first lawyer to "play for ruleS"86 in the
administrative courts, which set an example for attorneys beyond his
circle of disciples among younger generations of social cause lawyers. In
turn, the administrative courts have been receptive to this approach, by
relying on prior court decisions under similar circumstances or
accepting administrative law decisions from a foreign court, such as the
U.S. Supreme Court, as persuasive authority for innovative
interpretations of Thai law. 87
In the post-constitutional movement, the small community of
lawyers for social causes formed working groups to follow this strategy
for carefully selected cases. Surachai quickly became the litigation
expert for the environmental working group. His leadership of the Klity
Creek litigation working group and involvement in other well-publicized
environmental cases brought his expertise to the public's attention.8 8
Human Rights Watch lauded the Klity Creek decision as the first to
order a ministry to enforce the law by requiring a private company to
clean up pollution.8 9 For Surachai, the Klity Creek litigation had
85. See ENLAWTHAI FOUNDATION, http://enlawfoundation.org/newweb/?pageid= 1643
(2008). EnLaw has published two volumes of narratives about its cases. See ENLAWTHAI
FOUND., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWSUITS (2008).
86. "Playing for rules" is a term widely used in sociolegal research to refer to litigation
that attempts to establish rules or policy that will apply in future cases. See Marc
Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
L. & Soc'y REV. 165 (1974).
87. In Thailand's civil law jurisprudence, similar to France's, court decisions are not
considered precedent, but decisions are considered persuasive authority. Methods for
circulating decisions among lawyers in practice are slowly developing. Because these
systems are undeveloped, publicity for Surachai's litigation has been important, as is
networking and training among social cause lawyers.
88. Interview with the Director of the Water Quality Department of Pollution Control
Division, Mr. Boonchob Suthaanuswon (July 7, 2007); see also Simachaya, supra note 48.
89. See Thailand: Clean Up Klity Creek: Confront Toxic Legacy Before Reopening Lead
Mines, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec 15, 2014, 6:45 PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/15/thailand-clean-klity-creek (the Klity Creek decision
created a remedy for environmental damages by implying an affirmative duty to take
preventive action from the broad language of the Environmental Quality Act and Section
57 of the constitution and to establish a "polluter pays" standard).
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additional lessons.90 The opportunity to pursue a judicial remedy would
have been meaningless without compensation for costs the attorneys
could not control, including, in the Klity Creek case, maintenance for
families that had lost a means of livelihood and travel costs incurred
during protracted proceedings. The court was persuaded to provide a
remedy for the families' cost of living, but not travel, and required the
villagers to pay small but burdensome court fees. 91
Increasing publicity and praise for environmental litigation in the
administrative courts has changed Surachai's professional identity.
Success as a litigator has led to him to invest more of his effort in
litigation and far less in direct contact with the communities whose
NGO representatives initially selected him to become their advocate.
Initially an effective organizer who spoke directly to potential litigants
in the field, he has sacrificed much of that role to become the
consummate professional litigator, an expert in environmental and
administrative law, an important contact among litigators abroad, and a
valuable consultant for government officials in Thailand.92 Surachai has
trained a group of dedicated younger lawyers, and their success has
encouraged others outside his law firm to bring environmental law
suits. 93 As a result, environmental litigation in the administrative
courts has become a self-sustaining and expanding area of
entrepreneurial law practice.
For courts and lawyers, conditions have changed rapidly since
1997. The constitution that created the administrative court system and
the Constitutional Court have been modified twice after military
interventions in 2006 and 2014. New constitutions modified the
selection process for the Constitutional Court but otherwise left both the
90. According to Richard Pearshouse, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, Klity
Creek was a success in part because the Karen village maintained itself as a cohesive
social group committed to a common end. For this he credits their shared ethnic identity
and the presence of NGO workers who helped sustain the group's morale. See id.
91. The administrative courts have since amended their practice to permit waiver of
fees, and in some cases, they have awarded travel expenses. Interviews with one of
Surachais proteges, an experienced administrative court public interest litigator Sor.
Rattanamanee Pokla (Dec. 8, 2014, and Apr. 3, 2017).
92. Interviews with EnLAW Director Surachai Trongam (June 16, 2007; Feb. 27, 2008;
June 29, 2008; June 30, 2009; Dec. 10, 2014) (Surachais lack of foreign language skills
remains a major obstacle, but he employs younger attorneys fluent in English who serve a
link to experts in other countries).
93. Surachai s litigation is particularly effective because of his two-pronged strategy of
seeking compensation in the civil courts and policy change in the administrative courts.
Other lawyers, however, have been more selective, some drawn to the financial rewards of
bringing damage claims against the private partners of government development projects
and others seeking the publicity attained by victories in litigation against the government
itself.
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Constitutional Court and the administrative court system intact.
During interim periods under military rule, the organic law and
statutory authority of the administrative courts remained in force. After
restoration of an elected government in 2007, disruptive street protests
continued to interfere with normal life in Bangkok and sometimes shut
down key government institutions. Elite and middle-class
dissatisfaction mounted with Red Shirt populists who continued to
dominate elections. In 2014, following an election disrupted by
opponents of the Red Shirt government, Prime Minister Yingluck
Shinawatra was accused of abuse of power94 and removed from office by
the Constitutional Court. Shortly after, the military overthrew her
successor. The military junta in power since 2014 has broken an
unspoken rule that required returning power to a civilian government
within a relatively short time. Instead, the junta has remained in power
and exercised control over both policy development and the country's
political life.
Prospects for robust electoral democracy are considerably weaker as
the military deploys arrest and "reeducation" for those considered
politically disruptive and applies Thailand's lese majeste laws, a relic
from the age of monarchs that is used by military friends to suppress a
broad range of expression deemed a challenge to the authority of the
country's present rulers.95 In 2016, the junta conducted a carefully
controlled popular referendum to approve adoption of a constitution
designed to perpetuate the military's influence over Thailand's political
future.
Surachai's likely affinity with the Red Shirt movement might be
articulated privately among friends, but in public he is the consummate
litigator with a valued skill. His growing professional identity invokes
norms of political neutrality that the military government has
respected. Ironically, the military's limitations on the public space for
political dissent has been matched by reliance on formal legality to
maintain its legitimacy, a strategy that preserves the appearance of a
rule of law by allowing courts, often military, to adjudicate cases of
those it has arrested under laws adopted by the military's appointed
94. See Case Closed on Thawil Pleinsri's Case: Opening of Administrative Court's
Personnel Administration Division, supra note 61.
95. Restrictive laws govern public meetings and use of the Internet. The stated
purpose of these limitations on speech and assembly is to control politically partisan
expression and campaigning rather than public meetings or use of the internet in general.
Civil courts have upheld most of these charges, occasionally finding arrests procedurally
defective, but often applying lese majeste laws in instances where the interests of the
monarchy have been difficult for observers to discern. See DAVID STRECKFUSS, TRUTH ON
TRIAL: DEFAMATION, TREASON, AND LESE-MAJESTE (RETHINKING SOUTHEAST ASIA) (2011)
(it is also true that many non-political public protests are conducted without interference).
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Legislative Assembly or by junta regulations permitted under the 2016
Constitution. Notwithstanding harassment and arrests of attorneys
representing opponents of the military government or those that
monitor and disseminate information about the government's violations
of human and constitutional rights,96 attorneys are pursuing robust
non-political litigation against government ministries, their private
partners, and development projects. Judicial independence supported by
international recognition of judicial decisions that uphold non-political
rights seems to have created some protection for attorneys who defend
non-political rights.
Assessing the Support Structure for Administrative Courts
The differences and similarities between the outcomes of Kadar
Toy and Klity Creek litigation are a place to begin assessing the
strength of the support system for litigation in the administrative
courts. The Klity Creek decisions, other than the international praise
they drew, yielded no more concrete benefits for litigants than the
Kadar Toy settlement. The civil damages awarded to each litigant in the
cases were very similar. The pressure that the Klity Creek litigation in
the administrative courts placed on the Pollution Control Department to
create policy providing far greater protection to the public in the future
is of great long-term significance.97 Yet, few of the rights won in cases
like Klity Creek have had immediate benefits or resulted in immediate
policy change. Thai ministries are inefficient and subject to outside
influence, and change is complicated by multiple overlapping
responsibilities among ministries that encourages buck-passing. Of
course, projects that have been blocked by the courts remain blocked, in
some cases preserving villages or vital ecosystems from destruction.
These results confer immediate and far reaching benefits.
The limited capacity of courts to make lasting policy changes is not
a dilemma unique to Thailand, 98 and, as our analysis has suggested,
courts have other important functions through deployment of their
96. See Thailand: Events of 2017, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/thailand (last visited on July 24,
2018).
97. One of Surachai's collaborators says she regularly pressures administrative court
judges to expand the scope of policy interpretation to encompass risk elimination.
Interview with Sor.Rattanamanee Pokla (2014).
98. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBURG, THE HALLOW HOPE; CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE (1991) (comparing how the ineffectiveness of U.S. litigation
campaigns is due to "backlash" of organized counter-measures by the targets of litigation,
Thailand suffers from overall absence of effective enforcement mechanisms and outright
resistance from agencies).
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concurrent, convening, and expressive powers.99 First, the power to
review actions undertaken by officials enables administrative courts to
break up and re-center bureaucratic and political control of policies
created within Thailand's insular and tradition-bound ministries or
within its limited political space (concurrent power). Further,
administrative court proceedings potentially require officials to respond
to other stakeholders, which creates opportunities to negotiate outcomes
serving a wider range of interests (convening power). Finally, through
litigation, citizens denied more direct political access to government or a
forum in which to express their views may "have their day in court" and
an opportunity to appeal for wider support (expressive power). In turn,
an interested public10 0 or an attentive media seeking interviews with
the parties and further news coverage 01 may greatly increase the
responsiveness of officials. 102
Thus, litigation has benefits not measurable by court orders. Other
functions of courts-political and expressive-are consequential.
Litigation removes the timing, and content of public discussion of
ministry responsibilities is removed from ministry and political control.
Cases have drawn publicity, and publicity has placed ministry decisions
in the middle of an ongoing public discourse about rights. Ministries
must acknowledge the oversight role of courts and explain to a court,
and sometimes to the public at large, why they have acted as they do.
Thus, litigation may be one means by which the 1997 Constitution's
principle that citizens have rights (and a right to have rights) can
become a firm expectation.
Institutional factors suggest that systemic change through
99. See Dowdle, supra note 14.
100. Bishop provides evidence of the expressive function of courts in the Map Ta Phut
litigation, which has increased popular awareness and willingness to mobilize for more
general political action. See Bishop, supra note 47, at 113-17.
101. Administrative cases and decision are frequently reported by the press and
ministry decisions and the administrative courts themselves have been the subject of
commentary and interviews. See Vijarn Simachaya, Deputy Director General of Pollution
Control Department Opens Up about "Map Ta Phut"... Underground Water Contamination
- Volatile Organic Compound Causes Cancer, THAIPUBLICA [in Thai] (Mar. 2, 2012),
http://thaipublica.org/2012/03/wijarn-simachaya-maptaput-pollution/.
102. See, e.g., The PCD's rapid, but ultimately ineffective response to Klity Creek
pollution followed NGO release of the Klity Creek story. Similarly, ministries and
politicians responded quickly to the international publicity given the Map Ta Phut
decisions. Bishop, supra note 47, at 93.
Information about important litigation appears not only on the administrative courts'
website but on the Pollution Control Department's web pages. See POLLUTION CONTROL
DEP'T,http://www.ped.go.th/Info serv/pol maptapoot airnd.cfm?yy=2018;
http://www.ped.go.th/Download/pollutionkity.cfm; and Pollution Control Department,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/PCD.go.th.
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litigation will be limited. The successes of environmental rights
litigation in the administrative courts has not been replicated, for
example, for labor rights or work place safety litigation. 103 The absence
of successful litigation that contest ministerial failure to fulfill public
mandates is in part due to Thai substantive law and the control of
litigation by specialized labor courts, 104 but it is also a reflection of
another contingency-the necessity of mobilized group support. 105 Rural
communities are overrepresented among litigants in environmental
cases because they are natural solidary groups, sometimes with
indigenous leadership or long-standing NGO support that has long been
recognized as a legitimate voice for popular concerns. Further, in
societies with a longer history of litigation for rights, backlash has
limited gains from playing for rules.10 6 Bangkok's "global" law firms
recognize the importance of environmental regulation and are
prepared. 107 Therefore, in the long run gains through litigation may
depend to an increasing degree on litigation's other functions-
strengthening rights consciousness and expectations for compliance
with law, building social movements, and creating pressure for more
far-reaching policy change.
In place of a strong constitutional court, administrative court judges
are changing the force of law simply by adhering to its terms and
occasionally by adopting broad and innovative interpretations of
environmental rights. In the absence of a strong rights-oriented legal
profession, a small self-sustaining community of lawyers for social
causes brings cases challenging government policies to the courts.
103. One exception may be litigation by consumers in both civil and administrative
courts, which seems to be increasingly popular. The Foundation for Consumers raised
public awareness with well-publicized administrative court litigation to block a
government plan to privatize Thailand's electrical power supplier. Attorneys learned
quickly that some consumer cases reaped publicity and financial rewards. See Frank
Munger, Revolution Imagined: Cause Advocacy, Consumer Rights, and the Evolving Role
of NGOs in Thailand, 9 AsIAN J. ComP. L. 29, 44-51 (2015).
104. For example, the Labor Court, which resolves most employee matters is appealable
to the civil courts. Little effective litigation seems to have been brought on behalf of
employees in these courts or in the administrative courts.
105. Labor mobilization has long been suppressed by the Thai government, providing a
partial explanation for weak support for similar administrative court litigation. See, e.g.,
Sakdina Chatrakul Na Ayudhya, The Thai Labour Movement: Strength Through Unity:
Challenges and Recommendations, FRIEDERICH EBERT STIFTUNG (Oct. 2010),
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/thailand/07563.pdf.
106. See ROSENBURG, supra note 98.
107. For example, Baker McKenzie, and other "global" corporate law firms, regularly
update web postings on environmental law. See, e.g., Amendment to Environmental Act in
Thailand: Penalties Imposed on Development without EIA, BAKER McKENZIE (May 3,
2018), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2018/05/amendment-to-
environmental-act.
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Because the work of this community lacks domestic financial support,
seed money has often been found abroad, which has helped found or
sustain marginal law practices defending rights. As these ties have
become stronger after litigation successes, not only environmental
rights but also courts and the work of lawyers defending rights have
increasing legitimacy. Reciprocally, courts have continued to enforce
and develop environmental rights, which has encouraged a few more
cases. The numbers of cases remain small, and the increasing credibility
of the administrative courts and the lawyers who litigate their cases
may be the most important outcome.
CONCLUSION
Part V of this article examined the mutual construction of
administrative court authority, advocate careers, and communities
supporting the long process of administrative court litigation. The
political and constitutional legacy of the administrative courts is one of
the keys to understanding their subsequent development as institutions
embedded in routines of litigation. Notwithstanding the continuing
influence of Thailand's monarchy-centered civic religion, traditions of
deference, and patron-client relationships, Thailand's judiciary has
rendered decisions showing that it embraces a norm of independence. 108
This article emphasized other factors that are likely to be important
in developing countries, namely the development of support structures
within and outside the court system. Unlike the Thai Constitutional
Court, the administrative courts have created a network of advocates
and communities willing to litigate to protect existing statutory and
constitutional rights and to create new ones. Foreign seed money has
allowed some litigators to sustain litigation that provides little
compensation for the advocate. Like aid that for years has attempted to
encourage responsible civil society advocacy, support for litigation has
planted seeds of self-sustaining careers, and in turn, encouraged more
litigation both by the beneficiaries of aid and others who learned from
their example. In turn, international and domestic public support for
108. Independence is not the same apolitical, but rather it is the ability to keep political
ideology confined within legal norms and values, enabling a judge to reach decisions that
limit the power of bureaucrats and politicians. Upham, supra note 45, at 88-90. Thailand' s
judiciary has a reputation for being relatively free from corruption compared with some
other Southeast Asian courts. See, e.g., Chattham Prasongchanya, A Comparison of the
Appointment of the Judges in Thailand and Australia in terms of Judicial Independence,
OFF. INT'L AFF., OFF. JUDICIARY (2013) http://www.oia.coj.go.th/doc/data/oia/oia
1500436241.pdf (last visited Jul. 22, 2018) (comparing the appointment of judges in
Thailand and Australia).
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decisions curbing the powers of government officials and politicians has
undoubtedly reinforced the professional identity of judges themselves.
The administrative courts' growing legitimacy as an institution has had
repercussions for those who have become experts in litigation by
creating a legitimate and respected career path that has shielded them
from political reprisals under the present military government.
The greatest obstacle to independent review of executive authority
in Thailand has not been the lack of an independent judiciary but the
dominant bureaucratic structure of the Thai state. Thai ministries,
especially those supported by international business and financial
interests, have sufficient political power to manipulate policymaking to
undermine adverse administrative court decisions by means of
strategies that preempt administrative court authority. 109 Some
scholars suggest measuring the functions of the new Thai courts, as well
as those of other developing countries, by their "consequential" political
role in regime survival or transformation. 110 As this article has
explained, opportunities for the administrative courts to play such a
determinative role in the fate of a political regime in Thailand are
limited. Measured instead by the outcome of confrontations over the
power exercised routinely by those acting for the state in lesser roles,
the administrative courts have demonstrated capacity for independence.
The question remains: have Thailand's administrative courts had an
impact on Thai society and, more particularly, have they become an
alternative path to the rule of law? Viewing the administrative courts
and their supporting social system through a longer lens, since the
1970s, demographic and economic changes have given rise to demands
for new rights, many of which found means of expression in Thailand's
institutional and political space. In response, change has grown from
multiple points and at many different levels, sometimes with foreign
seed money. In turn, small changes, sometimes brought about by
litigation, have increased the efficacy of social movements, their leaders,
and to some degree their participants, as the Klity Creek and Map Ta
Phut litigations illustrate. Most of all, administrative courts have
routinized claims-making against the government. While investing in
litigation instead of direct political action is a much-debated strategy for
political change in Thailand, successful litigation in the administrative
courts by the environmental movement seems to have opened a door for
new rights. As sociolegal scholar Lauren Edelman observes, law should
be considered at least in part as endogenous and constructed in and
109. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Bishop, supra note 47.
110. See Tom Ginsburg, The Politics of Courts in Democratization Four Junctures in
Asia, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 45 (Diana
Kapiszewski, et al. eds., 2013).
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through the organizational fields that it seeks to regulate.111 The
mutual construction of an independent judiciary and law-abiding
officials is a prime example of endogenous legal change. The
administrative court judiciary, with its mandate to secure constitutional
and statutory accountability of private and government actors, is
showing signs of establishing an effective support system for
incremental realization of these expectations and becoming a force for
the progressive growth of a rule of law.
111. Lauren B. Edelman, Legality and the Endogeneity of Law, in LEGALITY AND
COMMUNITY: ONE THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF PHILIP SELZNICK 187, 192-93 (Robert A.
Kagan et al. eds., 2002).
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